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Finance Capitalism: A Look at the 
European Financial Accounts 
 
Summary: The paper explores the financial accounts database of Eurostat, a
rich set of data that is largely unexploited. It describes the main financial devel-
opments at EU level during the 1990-2010 period, both in terms of institutional 
agents and financial products. The paper provides evidence on the conse-
quences of asset price inflation for wealth distribution between institutional
agents and argues that the conceptual scheme of the “double monetary circuit”
of existing and recycled savings helps in describing and explaining the ob-
served patterns of financialisation.
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The Financial Accounts database of Eurostat is more recent than the American Flow 
of Funds (Morris A. Copeland 1944; Wassily Leontief and Andras Brody 1993) and 
has been much less exploited, in part because of a still incomplete homogeneity in 
the quality of the data. Nonetheless it is very rich dataset and is the only tool that 
allows direct country comparisons of financial developments at European level. It is 
therefore interesting to explore its content. The descriptive analysis presented here 
covers the period 1990-2010, for which the salient facts are examined, mainly at EU 
and Euro Area’s level, with a breakdown in terms of institutional agents and financial 
products. The data is interpreted with reference to a conceptual framework that can 
be broadly qualified as post Keynesian (Marc Lavoie 1992, 2009; Paul Davidson 
2011; Eckhard Hein and Engelbert Stockhammer 2011; but also Luigi L. Pasinetti 
2007). The simple model retained refers to the central transaction identity of the 
stock-flow consistent approach of Wynne Godley and Lavoie (2006), which repre-
sents a natural choice for the analysis of financial data produced by contemporary 
national accounts (Eurostat 1996; United Nations, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, European Commission, International Monetary Fund, 
and World Bank 2003, 2009).  
The identity can be traced back to Michal Kalecki and has been a reference for 
the authors working in his tradition, such as Malcolm Sawyer, Joseph Steindl, Eck-
hard Hein, Jan Toporowski and others, including Augusto Graziani and Alain Par-
guez, reference authors for the theory of the monetary circuit (Joseph Halevi and 
Rédouane Taouil 2002). The latter is a modern attempt to rationalise the concept of a 
monetary production economy developed by John Maynard Keynes (Keynes 1963), 
and it is one of the few available theoretical tools that provide a macroeconomic ex- 
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planation of the monetary role of banks, allowing for meaningful policy analyses. For 
this reason, it is used extensively in the interpretation of the data examined.  
The financial accounts of Eurostat are established under ESA1995 (Eurostat 
1996) and are therefore fully integrated into a complete stock-flow consistent repre-
sentation of economic reality organized around the concept of institutional sector 
(see Section 2), which corresponds to the macroeconomic grouping of the monetary 
theory of production. They offer many ways to test the propositions deriving from 
this theory, and the descriptive/interpretative analysis presented here represents a 
preliminary step in this direction. The results obtained concern the consequences of 
asset price inflation for the wealth distribution between the main institutional agents. 
The conceptual scheme of the “double monetary circuit” of existing and recycled 
savings is proposed as a useful scheme for interpreting observed financialisation pat-
terns. 
 
1. A Simple Conceptual Framework  
 
The standard macroeconomic models usually consider a single aggregate good in an 
economy with three sectors: the “private sector”, the Government, and the Rest of the 
World (RoW), or foreign sector (Graziani 1988, pp. 98-100). The private sector cor-
responds to the consolidation of the institutional sectors S11, S12, S14 and S15 in 
ESA1995. The Government corresponds to the sector S13 and the RoW to the sector 
S2 (see Table 1 in Section 2). In national accounts the financial sector is separated 
from the rest of the non-Government domestic producers, but banks and financial 
institutions are consolidated into one single aggregate, including also public banks 
and the central bank, generally majority-owned by the State.  
In this sectoral breakdown, one can easily miss the role of the banking sector, 
whose role in the theory of the circuit is to produce liquid liabilities (money) used for 
payments by the other sectors. The main problem, which is only partially solved in 
the national accounts, is that the process of money creation and destruction, which 
typically develops in the transactions between the central bank and other monetary 
institutions on one side, and households and the non-financial enterprises on the 
other side, is neglected. All these sectors are consolidated within a single “private 
sector” aggregate within which internal transactions cancel out and which produces a 
single good called “output”, separated from the non-money output of the Govern-
ment. Although this output can be measured in monetary units, in the standard model 
this money is essentially a “veil”, irrelevant for the determination of economic equi-
librium. In contrast with this practice, it is typical of the approaches of the monetary 
theory of production such as that of Graziani (2003), the generalised monetary cir-
cuit approach developed by Parguez, or the closely related theory of emissions of 
Bernard Schmitt and the Dijon-Fribourg-Lugano school (Sergio Rossi 2007), to put 
money and the banking sector at the centre of the analysis and therefore to separate 
the banking sector in its two components of commercial banks and the central bank 
(S121 and S122) from the rest of the private sector. The traditional macroeconomic 
aggregation into a consolidated private sector can however still be used, as done in 
Section 3 below, provided that the role of financial institutions is not forgotten.  
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To discuss money creation and destruction, it is also necessary to adopt a dy-
namic perspective. In doing so, it is logical to start from a situation where the initial 
stock of financial assets is zero, since it is not possible to explain the creation of 
money based on previously existing amounts of the same asset (Graziani 1984a, p. 
8). The generalised Kalecki’s identity (or profit equation) provides the convenient 
starting point for analysing changes in assets between two periods, since it represents 
the key flow condition providing the “transaction” link between the opening and the 
closing balance sheets in national accounts, or in other words between stocks and 
flows (See Chapter 2 of Godley and Lavoie 2006, for a detailed explanation of the 
transaction and balance sheet matrices).  
 
 
Source: Drawn by the author. 
 
Figure 1  The Generalized Kalecki Identity and Financial Accounts 
 
Realized profits thus represent the main stock-flow financial variable linking 
the economy’s balance sheets between two successive closing dates. In an economy 
starting in the initial period with no assets, transactions between two periods and the 
closing balance sheet coincide in net terms. The above justifies the use of the Kaleck-
i’s relation to discuss a number of policy issues For the three macroeconomic sectors 
aggregation retained usually, the relation says that if the private sector accumulates a 
net financial surplus, this is due either to an accumulation of Government debt (Gov-
ernment deficit) or to an accumulation of debt of foreigners towards residents (corre-
sponding to a balance of payments current account surplus for the domestic economy 
when net factor incomes and current transfers from abroad are neglected).  
 
FP  DEFG    X M    (1)
 
Where: 
 
ΔFP   =   Accumulation of financial assets by the domestic private sector; 
DEFG  =  Financial liabilities accumulated by the State (Government deficit); 
X–M  =   Liabilities accumulated by the Rest of the World towards residents  
    (NIA Current Account Surplus on goods and services for the  
   domestic  economy). 
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Relation (1) is named here after Kalecki although strictly speaking it corre-
sponds to Kalecki’s original profit equation only when households do not save and 
capitalist invest the whole of their surplus (Toporowski 2008). These were the as-
sumptions retained by Kalecki (1929, 1933), who developed the link between net 
Government expenditures, the trade balance and profits in articles published in Polish 
and integrated in English in his famous article on the theory of profits (Kalecki 
1942). When workers do not save, in a closed economy without State, gross profits 
are given by the sum of investment plus capitalists’ consumption. Kalecki worked on 
a breakdown between workers and capitalists rather than one between households 
and enterprises, but if workers’ savings are neglected and profits, rather than invest-
ments, are the focus of the analysis, it is acceptable to name relation (1) after him, 
since he discovered all of its terms. John Hicks (1973, pp. 30-31) also gives promi-
nence to Kalecki’s original variant of relation (1) as the “social accounting equation”. 
One can note that in (1) the private and the public sectors can be aggregated or dis-
aggregated in any number of institutional sub-sectors. For instance the financial bal-
ances can be taken net or gross of fixed capital formation, the latter net or gross of 
capital consumption (depreciation). In his celebrated paper, Steindl (1982) consoli-
dates the banking sector with the rest of the private sector. Toporowski (2000) shows 
instead how, once the banking sector is netted out from the private and public sector, 
relation (1) can be related to the inflows and outflows of liquid assets into the capital 
market, which are the main determinant of asset price inflation. 
As it is the case for all stock-flow consistent modelling in discrete time, rela-
tion (1) assumes that a flow variable (here profit) corresponds to the difference be-
tween the end of period and the beginning of period value of the same stock variable 
(net worth). However, strictly speaking, the stock difference is equal to the net flow 
of the variable, i.e. the difference between the cumulated inflows and outflows. In 
applying relation (1) to actual data, one thus makes an implicit approximation. In-
deed, even if national accounts recommend gross recording of all transactions, they 
recognize that this is not the practice followed for the change in inventories or for 
financial flows (Eurostat 1996, p. 14). If one is interested in gross flows, the only 
solution is to shorten the accounting period enough for the net flow to be either an 
outflow or an inflow. In practice available data do not allow to do this, so one must 
either work with net flows as an approximation of gross flows or try to work with 
continuous time models (Giancarlo Gandolfo 1981). 
1 
Irrespective of the nature of flows, being an identity, (1) can be interpreted ex 
ante as an equilibrium condition (possibly considered gross of investment), as it re-
flects the expectations of the private domestic sector that anticipates goods profits if, 
ceteris paribus, the budget deficit is expected to be higher and/or the Rest of the 
World is expected to borrow in the domestic market to buy domestically produced 
goods (Parguez 2010-2011). This condition on private sector expectations can corre-
spond to a situation of full employment and full utilisation of productive capacity, on 
or out of a steady state. Ex post it is an accounting truism fulfilled at any point in 
time. It reflects the “temporary monetary equilibrium” (Graziani 2003, pp. 125-126), 
                                                        
1 The author is grateful to Bernard Vallageas for raising this point.  
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corresponding in general to a neoclassical “real long-term disequilibrium” with un-
employment and underutilisation of productive capacity. In this case the accumula-
tion of real and financial stocks during a particular time interval is in part involun-
tary. If some of the accumulated stocks are, or will prove to be, unwanted, they 
measure the divergence of reality from the expectations on the basis of which it was 
generated and thus reflect a real disequilibrium (Frank Hahn 1984a, b). Taken as an 
expression of a monetary equilibrium, the Kalecki’s identity reflects a temporary 
equilibrium without market efficiency and thus without rational expectations (Jean-
Michel Grandmont 2008), i.e. it describes a non-Modigliani-Miller world where fi-
nance counts (Pasinetti 2012). In this world, expectations must be exogenous, con-
trary to the main hypothesis retained by the rational expectations literature (Davidson 
1982-1983) and followed by both new neoclassical and new Keynesians. The relation 
implies that the generalised theory of the monetary circuit developed over time by 
Parguez (1975, 1977, 1980, 1996a, b, 2001) is not a static theory of the single period. 
The latter was used in the early literature of the circuit to illustrate the role of money 
creation and destruction. 
The ex post interpretation of (1) out of an equilibrium of perfect forecasts (ra-
tional expectations) implies also a causality between its three terms, which, in line 
with the theory of the monetary circuit, goes from expected profits (marked below 
with an asterisk), to money and revenue creation, employment, effective demand and 
finally realised profits, money destruction and accumulation of liquid balances. This 
is a consequence of the fact that in the circuit money is created and is extinguished 
by credit. In line with the banking school position and contrary to the currency 
school position, credit makes deposits, thus investment causes savings, cf. Schmitt 
(1975a), Lavoie (1984), Louis-Philippe Rochon (1999), Charles Rist (2002), 
Graziani (2003, pp. 82-88). In his doctoral thesis, Olivier Giovannoni argued that, in 
the US, government expenditures are the strongly exogenous demand component 
driving the business cycle, which implies that it is the Government expected deficits 
(or surpluses) that drive the expectations of the rest of the sectors of the economy. 
 
 
 
 
 
The econometric analysis of exogeneity carried out in Giovannoni (2006) and 
in Giovannoni and Parguez (2007) uses the technique of co-integrated VARS devel-
oped by Johansen (see Katarina Juselius 2006) that aims at capturing long-term exo-
geneity. The results obtained confirm the previous results of Robert Eisner (1994) 
and are not in contradiction with the approach of Edward E. Leamer (2007), who 
identifies residential investment as a leading indicator of the business cycle, implying 
some short-term exogeneity of the housing sector, both Eisner and Leamer having  
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used more conventional exogeneity tests.
2 The results of Giovannoni are thus in line 
with the theory of the monetary circuit and the hierarchy it introduces between insti-
tutional sectors for the realisation of their expectations through the creation of money 
by credit, the hierarchy being: (i) State; (ii) Banks; (iii) Enterprises; (iv) Households 
(Parguez 2008). With the necessary caveats, identity (1) can be tracked statistically, 
as done in Section 3.  
 
2. The Data Examined 
 
The financial accounts database of Eurostat is compiled according to European Ac-
counts regulations (Eurostat 1996
3). As with all data produced by the European sta-
tistical office, an effort is made to obtain data comparable across Europe based on a 
common set of consistent definitions. ESA95 rules are fully consistent with SNA 
1993 and are being progressively adapted to the SNA 2008 (United Nations, Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, European Commission, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and World Bank 2003, 2009). 
The ESA95 system: “is built around a sequence of inter-connected accounts. 
The full sequence of accounts for the institutional units and sectors is composed of 
current accounts, accumulation accounts and balance sheets … Current accounts deal 
with the production, generation, distribution and redistribution of income and the use 
of this income in the form of final consumption. Accumulation accounts cover 
changes in assets and liabilities and changes in net worth (the difference for any insti-
tutional unit or group of units between its assets and liabilities). Balance sheets pre-
sent stocks of assets and liabilities and net worth.” (Eurostat 1996, par. 1.61.)
4 The 
Financial Account is one of the two accumulation accounts that closes the sequence 
of production accounts and it records the changes in the financial assets and liabili-
ties that compose net lending or borrowing by type of financial instrument. In other 
words, the balances of the Financial Account reflect the previous balances from the 
production accounts and impact on the total balance sheets of the system. In flow 
terms, the account deals with the allocation of current financial savings after fixed 
investments, illustrating their interaction with financial savings inherited from the 
past in funding financial investment. An example of the transition between the total 
financial assets of two successive years is given in an Annex available upon request. 
For the institutional sectors, ESA95 gives consistent definitions for net lending and 
borrowing balances and indicates how these balances are used in the creation and 
destruction of financial assets. The classification of financial assets in ESA95 does 
not correspond to that of the International Accounting Standards. Other main differ-
ences between ESA1995 and IAS 30, 32 and 39 are (Eurostat 1993): 
 
 
                                                        
2 The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for the reference to Leamer. 
3 The ESA95 manual, available also on line, is often referred to in the following text 
(http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/esa95en.htm) and its Annexes, available 
upon request. Most of the time the reference is to the relevant paragraph of the manual.  
4 The sequence comprises 4 groups of accounts dealing with: I. Production, II. Distribution, III. Accumu-
lation, IV. Balance sheet.   
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(i) Maturity breakdown: original maturity in ESA 95, residual maturity in IAS. 
(ii) Netting of financial assets and liabilities: gross recording in ESA 95, net 
reporting in IAS 1 under some conditions. 
(iii) Valuation: in ESA 95 market price for most assets, but not for deposits, 
loans and other accounts receivable or payable (as they are not marketable); under 
IAS 39 all financial assets measured at fair value. 
The financial assets retained by ESA95 are grouped under seven product head-
ings, whose total makes total financial assets, and 5 main institutional sectors. Both 
are described in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1   Financial Products and Institutional Sectors  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: Author based on Eurostat (1996). 
 
3. Kalecki’s Identity 1990-2011 
 
As discussed in Section 1 above Kalecki’s identity provides an acceptable starting 
point for the analysis of stock-flow dynamics. In the national accounts it can be ex-
amined at the level of net lending, which is the balancing item of the financial ac-
count in transaction terms (flows). Figure 2 below looks at the net-lending flows for  
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the 3 main institutional sectors retained in relation (1) for EU27: the private sector, 
the public sector and the rest of the world. Unconsolidated data are looked at, be-
cause they are available over a longer period (a comparison with consolidated data is 
available for each sector upon request). The figure shows that given the relative sta-
bility of the current account balance on goods and services (G&S) with the Rest of 
the World (dotted line), the private sector surplus (dashed line), mirrors with almost 
perfect symmetry the General Government deficit (continuous line). One can note 
that a negative net lending of the Rest of the World (RoW) means net borrowing by 
the RoW, hence a current account surplus on goods and services for the domestic 
economy. 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 2  The Kalecki Identity in EU 27 – Unconsolidated Data 
 
Up to the beginning of the crisis (1990-2008), the private sector of EU27 gen-
erated a financial surplus between 0 and 400 billions Euros, against a General Gov-
ernment deficit of essentially the same size. In this period the current account on 
G&S was generally in surplus between 0 and 100 billions Euros. From 2008 to 2011, 
the private surplus increased to 600 billions Euros, with a parallel increase in the 
Government deficit, whereas the current account on goods and services turned into a 
small deficit for the domestic economy. For the whole period 2000-2011, the surplus 
of the private sector remained on an upward trend. Within the private sector (figure 
available upon request), the financial corporations were stable between 1990 and 
2001, followed by a continuous trend of increasing financial surplus. For the house-
holds, there was a continuous decrease in the financial surplus between 1995 and 
2007 followed by a strong increase to 300 billions Euros during the crisis. Non-
Financial corporations have been more cyclical. Also non-financial corporations in-
creased their net lending with the crisis. The developments for the Euro area were 
similar. 
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The accumulation over time of net lending determines the net financial worth, 
which is the balance of the financial account from the point of view of the stocks. 
This balance enters the total balance sheet of an economy (or a sector). Table 2 be-
low presents the consolidated financial balance sheet of EU27 for the year 2010. To-
tal financial assets of EU27 amounted to 57,400 billions Euros in 2010, or 560% of 
GDP, against 58,800 billions Euros of liabilities, hence a negative balance of 1,400 
billions, which represents a negative net financial worth (BF90). This is only a com-
ponent of the net worth of the economy (B90), since in ESA95 the total net worth is 
the sum of financial and non-financial net worth.  
 
Table 2   The Financial Account of EU 27 for 2010 – EUR Billions 
 
  
GDP in 2010: 12 260    Total economy (S1)   
Private sector
(S1-S13)  
General government 
(S13)   Rest of the world (S2) 
Assets Liab.  Assets Liab.  Assets  Liab.  Assets Liab. 
 F1 - Monetary gold and SDRs   414  414  0  (26) 
 F2 - Currency and deposits   11 129  12 602  10 469  12 300  660  303  6 895  5 214 
 F21 - Currency   517  514  517  491  1  23  200  110 
 F22 - Transferable deposits   3 728  4 120  3 437  3 970  291  151  1 759  1 374 
 F29 - Other deposits   6 883  7 968  6 516  7 839  368  129  5 030  3 730 
 F3 - Securities other than shares   10 483  12 288  10 087  5 437  396  6 851  10 616  9 188 
 F4 - Loans   13 660  12 161  13 193  10 609  467  1 552  4 349  6 180 
 F5 - Shares and other equity   15 615  15 743  13 980  15 737  1 635  6  11 713  11 009 
 F6 - Insurance technical reserves   3 771  3 911  3 767  3 902  4  8  328  110 
 F7 - Other receivable/payable   2 349  2 138  1 675  1 667  674  471  828  1 034 
 Total   57 420  58 843  53 585  49 652  3 835  9 190  34 703  32 735 
 BF90 - Net financial assets   (1 422)  3 933  (5 355)  1 967 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Eurostat does not provide a consolidation of the private sector, hence the pri-
vate sector can either be obtained by adding the three components of corporates, 
banks and households (S11 + S12 + S14&S15) or by subtracting the Government 
(S13) from the total for the domestic economy (S1). In the first case the total of the 
private sector plus the government sector exceeds the total domestic economy (S1), 
whereas in the second case it is different from the sum of its subsectors
5. In the table 
above the private sector, calculated by subtraction of the General Government from 
the total domestic economy, holds combined net financial assets worth 53,600 billion 
Euros, or 437% of GDP, generating a net financial worth of some 3,900 billions Eu-
ros, or 32% of GDP (GDP EU27 in 2012 = 12,260 billions Euros). The General Gov-
ernment holds financial assets for 3,800 billions Euros, or 31% of GDP, against fi-
nancial liabilities of 9,190 billions Euros (or 75% of GDP). The majority of these are 
securities (F3) and loans (F4) issued by the General Government, which as a first 
approximation can be viewed as an indicator of gross public debt in the Maastricht 
sense. These accounted for 69% of GDP in 2010, i.e. of the order of one sixth of the 
financial assets held by the private sector (see Photis Lysandrou 2011). For the ag-
gregate of the Rest of the World, covering non-resident units dealing with domestic 
institutional units (S2), consolidated financial assets represented 283% of GDP and 
financial liabilities 267% of GDP, implying a net financial worth of 16% of GDP. In 
                                                        
5 The author is grateful to Sérgio Lagoa on this point.  
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principle this should exclude assets and liabilities held by branches and foreign sub-
sidiaries of European companies that should be consolidated with their mother com-
panies, but this is not always the case
6. For instance Eurostat (2009) explicitly men-
tions that in Ireland and Switzerland subsidiaries of domestic companies are classi-
fied in the rest of the world whenever they are registered abroad. One can note that 
the openness rate in terms of financial assets is about 60%, or some 4 times the usual 
openness ratio calculated from trade flows in terms of exports and imports of goods 
and services
7. 
 
4. The Evidence on Asset Price Inflation 
 
When the financial account is normalized by GDP, the time series indicators ob-
tained can be interpreted in terms of “speed differences” between the growth rate of 
the components of the financial account (the numerator, measuring a stock) and GDP 
(the denominator, measuring a flow)
8. 
The ratio of total financial assets normalized by GDP is sometimes used as an 
indicator of financial development. Since its evolution through time gives an indica-
tion on the relative speed at which financial stocks and productive revenues (flows) 
develop, it measures indirectly the “financial rents” accumulated through asset price 
inflation, particularly if one assumes that quantities in the numerator and the deno-
minator evolve in a parallel way. This assumption can be accepted as a first ap-
proximation, since the notion of quantity for a financial asset is not really meaningful 
and can thus be normalized according to needs. The evolution of the ratio of financial 
assets to GDP for EU 27 and for the Euro area is shown in the Figure 3 and 4 below.  
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 3  Unconsolidated Data  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
6 The author thanks Domenica Tropeano for raising this issue.  
7 The former is calculated as the ratio of the total financial assets of the rest of the world divided by the 
financial assets of the domestic economy, the latter is given by the ratio of the sum of exports and im-
ports, divided by two, over GDP.  
8 With obvious notations: 
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Source: Financial accounts – Eurostat (EU27: only available countries, UK excluded). 
 
Figure 4  Consolidated Data  
 
For Unconsolidated Financial Assets (UFA) in Figure 3 the ratio has increased 
from 5-6 x GDP in 1995, to about 11 x GDP in 2010, i.e. UFA thus increased 90% 
more than GDP over 16 years. For consolidated data, shown in Figure 4, the ratio of 
Financial Assets (FA) to GDP is higher for the Euro Area than for EU27 as the con-
solidated aggregate EU27 does not include UK
9. The two indicators have the same 
trend in the period 2000-2010. Consolidated Financial Assets (FA) grew 30% more 
than GDP in the Euro Area and 40% more in EU27. As discussed above, this is pri-
ma facie evidence of asset price inflation (Michel Aglietta 1998; Toporowski 2000, 
2010), as, even if one discounts future gains, it is relatively unlikely that the value of 
accumulated financial assets should grow much faster than GDP, i.e. of the real 
wealth produced and distributed, over a protracted period of time.  
Figure 5 below compares the growth rate of the ratio of Consolidated Finan-
cial Assets (CFA) to GDP by country, whereas Figure 6 below shows the value of 
that ratio for the year 2010. Amongst the high CFA/GDP countries: the “speed dif-
ference with GDP” was 3% for Luxembourg (LU), 9% for Ireland (IE), 3% for Ger-
many (DE), 8% for France (FR), and 6% for Italy (IT). 
Cross-country consolidated data for 2010/11 in Figure 6 below shows that 
Luxembourg is clearly an outlier with CFA/GDP at 126 x GDP; Ireland is also very 
high with 24 x GDP; France and Italy are relatively large economies with relatively 
low shares of CFA on GDP; UK is not available for consolidated data, but probably 
close to NL or higher (NL is at 14 x GDP). Germany is at 7 x GDP. Portugal and 
Spain are relatively high when compared to France and Italy, which, like in Ireland, 
might be due to a faster inflation of residential property (see below with Figures 8-9). 
More direct evidence of asset price inflation can be found in the indicator for 
the equity prices shown in Figure 7 below, which compares the Dow Jones, to the 
Dax and the Nikkei. It shows that equity price inflation was mainly at work in EU 
and US during the 90s, whereas the peak for Nikkei was the year 1989. The growth 
                                                        
9 For UFA, UK is available and the ratio of UFA/GDP of EU27 is above the Euro Area. For both the 
Euro Area and the EU27, this ratio is obviously higher in absolute terms than with consolidated data. 
This however should not distort the trend, and the indicator has the same profile of that calculated with 
consolidated data, but it is preferable, as it is available for a longer period. 
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of DAX and the Dow Jones was extremely fast during the 1990s (x4). On the con-
trary, in the first decade of the new millennium the stock market continued to grow, 
but at a lower pace and with wider fluctuations. In US the index is marginally higher 
in 2011 than what it was in 2000. In Germany 2011 is just below 2000, but mean-
while there was the peak of 2007. Therefore the indication from this figure seems to 
be that in term of asset price inflation, equity prices were not the main driver in the 
last decade, contrary to the previous one.  
 
 
 
Note: Cross-country dynamics: Growth in the CFA/GDP ratio was particularly fast in CY (14%), HU and MT (12%), DK 
(10%), IE (9%), FR and LV (8%), LT (7%) and EE (6%). 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 5 Growth of CFA/GDP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Cross-country, last year: Only LU has a higher ratio of CFA to GDP than IE (126, against 24 for IE). NL is at 14; SE 
at 8; DE, MT, PT, FI at 7, and ES, CY, AT, NO and the EA 6. 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 6  CFA/ GDP - Last Year 
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Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s online databases. 
 
Figure 7  Share Price Indexes 
 
The picture was different for residential prices, which have been rising fast in 
many European countries since 1995. Residential property is not included in the fi-
nancial account (it appears in the real capital account). When financed by debt, it is 
an important factor of financial asset inflation.
10 Shares and residential property are 
used as collateral for loans and therefore their prices influence the growth of credit 
and debt aggregates, which can themselves retroact on asset price inflation. As 
shown in Figure 8 below, between 1995-2009 in the Euro Area residential prices 
(new and existing dwellings) increased by 79%, while the GDP deflator, measuring 
inflation for goods and services produced, increased by 29%. In the same period, the 
increase in residential prices for new dwellings was respectively 0%, 177% and 
207% in DE, ES and IE (Figure 9).  
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s online databases. 
  
Figure 8  Germany and the Euro Area. Residential Price Inflation (1995=100) 
 
 
 
                                                        
10 The author is grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing to this issue. 
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ES, IE and EA, residential prices, good and poor condition 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s online databases. 
 
Figure 9  Spain, Ireland and the Euro Area. Residential Price Inflation (1995=100) 
 
The evolution of debt is examined below through debt securities data pub-
lished by the European Central Bank for the Euro Area. Between 1990-2010 total 
debt issues by the domestic economy (Figure 10) increased much faster than GDP, 
particularly for monetary financial institutions (MFI), corresponding to the consoli-
dation of ESA95 sectors S121 and S122, which increased from 861 billion Euros in 
1990 to 7,500 billion Euros in 2010, after having peaked at 10,058 billion Euros in 
2007. Instead, issues by the General Government (GG) grew much less spectacular-
ly: whereas they were at the same level as those of the MFI up to 1998, when they 
reached 1,280 billions Euros, they grew much less in the following years, up to the 
crisis, when they started to accelerate, in parallel to a relative decline of issues by 
MFI. Outstanding debt of the General Government remained continuously slightly 
above that of banks, except for the year 2008. Compared to non-financial corporates, 
corresponding to ESA95 S10 (line with squares in Figure 10), GG issues were below 
or at a similar level in terms of GDP up to the crisis, then they partially substituted 
for the deleveraging of corporates and MFIs. Non-Monetary Financial Institutions, 
(NMFI, corresponding to ESA95 S123-S125) have the lowest level of debt issuance. 
 
Issues of debt securities by EA's domestic issuers 
Euro area residents – Issues in all currencies – Annual data – EUR bn 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Monetary Indicators online database. 
 
Figure 10   Euro Area Security Issues 
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Redemptions of debt securities by EA's domestic issuers 
Euro area residents – Issues in all currencies – Annual data – EUR bn 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Monetary Indicators online database. 
 
Figure 11   Euro Area Redemptions of Securities 
 
For redemptions (Figure 11 above) the developments were similar, suggesting 
that most debt issued in the form of securities is rolled over from one year to the oth-
er. Not all however, as redemption are generally lower than issues, indicating in-
creasing net debt. 
 
Net issues of debt securities by EA's domestic issuers 
Euro area residents – Issues in all currencies – Annual data – EUR bn 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Monetary Indicators online database. 
 
Figure 12   Euro Area Net Issues of Securities 
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Securities by EA’s domestic issuers: amounts outstanding 
Euro area residents – Issues in all currencies – Annual data – EUR bn 
 
   
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Monetary Indicators online database. 
 
Figure 13   Euro Area Amounts of Securities Outstanding 
 
Indeed Figure 12 above shows that total net issues of the Euro Area were 400 
billions Euros per year in the 1990s, and tripled to 1,200 billions in 2009, to then 
halve in 2010 to 600 billions Euros. In terms of amounts outstanding (Figure 13 on 
the right above), starting from 1997-1998 domestic debt outstanding exceeded GDP. 
Debt of Non-Financial Monetary Institutions (S123, S124, S125) started exceeding 
that of Non-Financial Corporations (S10) from 2003-4 and increased markedly after 
2006. 
 
5. Developments by Sector and Product in the Euro Area 
 
5.1 A Global View on the Domestic Economy (S1)  
 
Table 3 and 4 below show the size of the main assets and liabilities per sector for the 
whole Euro Area in 2010 in % of GDP (GDP of the Euro Area was 9,148 billions 
Euros in 2010). For the total of the domestic economy (S1) Financial Assets 
represented 560% of GDP in 2010 (Table 3). Shares and other equity (F5) were the 
largest item, corresponding to 151% of GDP, held mainly by the financial sector 
(S12) and the Rest of the World (RoW).  
 
Table 3   Main Assets Euro Area (2010 - % of GDP) 
 
 S 1 S 11 S 12 S 13 S 14&15 RoW 
FA 563  104  429  34  200  348 
F5 151  47  87  14  48  118 
F4 135  15  167  4  1  40 
F1&2 115  21  57  6  71  71 
F3 105  3  108  4  15  108 
F6  37 2 0  0 61  4 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
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Loans (F4) represented 135% of GDP, almost entirely concentrated in the as-
sets of banks, which are a subsector of S12, and the RoW, which includes the foreign 
banking sector. Gold, currency and deposits (F1+F2) represented 116% of GDP, be-
ing mainly held by households (S14+S15), RoW, financial corporations and non-
financial corporations (S10). Securities (F3) represented 105% of GDP; mainly held 
by financial corporations and RoW. Insurance technical reserves (F6): represented 
37% of GDP in the consolidated domestic economy; held by households for an 
amount of 62% of GDP.  
 
Table 4   Main Liabilities Euro Area (2010 - % of GDP) 
 
 S 1 S 11 S 12 S 13 S 14&15 RoW 
FL 572  201  416  92  68  334 
F5 151  104  94  0  0  111 
F1&2 126  0  162  3  0  54 
F3 123  10  70  69  0  94 
F4 115  69  20  16  63  64 
F6 38  4  61  0  0  1 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Liabilities are shown in Table 4 above. Financial liabilities represented 572% 
of GDP. Shares and equity (F5) represented 151% of GDP, financing mainly non-
financial corporates, financial corporates and RoW. Gold, currency and money 
(F1+F2) represented 126% of GDP, financing mainly banks and RoW. Securities 
(F3) represented 124% of GDP, financing financial corporations (S12), Government 
and the RoW mainly. Loans (F4) represented 115% of GDP, they are due essentially 
by corporates and households. Insurance technical reserves represented (F6) 
represented 38% of GDP, being a liability for the financial corporates (for 61% of 
GDP).  
Table 5 below presents the dynamics by product and sector in the period 2000-
10, during which total FA of the Euro Area domestic economy grew 3% faster than 
GDP. The latter grew at 3.3% per year in nominal terms, hence financial assets grew 
by 6.5% per year on average in absolute terms. Currency and deposits (F2) grew 4% 
faster than GDP. Securities (F3) grew 5% faster than GDP.  
 
Table 5   EA: Average Annual Growth Rate of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Sector for the  
Period 2000-2010 
 
Annual growth 2000-2010 % per annum
S1 S11 S12 S121_S122  S121 S122 S12-(S121+S122) S13 S14_S15  S2 
A L A L A L A L  A L A L A L A L A L  A  L 
BF90 Net financial assets  -0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4%  0.0% -0.1% 0.7% 0.1% -2.3%  0.1% 
Total assets/liabilities  3% 3% 1% 1% 4% 4% 3% 3%  9% 8% 6% 6% 5% 4% 2% 2% 0%  3%  8%  8% 
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs  9% 9% 9%    8% 10%    12%    
F2 Currency and deposits  4% 3% 4% 6% 3% 6% 4%  9% 10% 7% 5% 5% 0% -1% 2%     6%  7% 
F21 Currency  4% 4% 1% 0% 4% 0% 2%  5% 0% 0% 0% 10% 0% 0% 4%     27%  0% 
F22 Transferable deposits  7% 8% 4% 11% 6% 13% 7%  3% 7% 10% 8% 5% 1% 3% 10% 5%     12%  9% 
F29 Other deposits  3% 2% 5% 5% 2% 4% 3%  10% 29% 6% 5% 5% -2% -1% -7% 0%     4%  6% 
F3 Secur. oth. than shares  5% 5% -7% 4% 5% 5% 5% 3%  9% 7% 9% 9% 5% 12% 13% 2% -1%     9%  11% 
F33 Sec. o. t. shares excl. der.  4% 4% -7% 4% 4% 4% 5% 2%  8% 8% 8% 4% 11% 13% 2% -1%     8%  10% 
F331 Short-term – excl. der.  8% 6% 2% -5% 7% 4% 6% 3%  4% 9% 6% 9% 7% 0% 7% -8%     9%  17% 
F332 Long-term – excl. der.  4% 4% -9% 6% 4% 4% 4% 2%  9% 8% 8% 4% 12% 13% 2% -1%     8%  9% 
F34 Financial derivatives  18% 20% -7% 7% 18% 18% 21% 21%  0% 17% 15% 17% 15%    20%  18% 
F4 Loans  3% 3% 7% 2% 3% 7% 3% 4%  3% 5% 8% 5% 8% 0% 2% -1%  3%  8%  9% 
F41 Short-term – Loans  5% 3% 7% -1% 3% 9% 2% 0%  12% 3% 0% 5% 9% 4% 15% 0%  -2%  7%  9% 
F42 Long-term – Loans  3% 3% 7% 4% 4% 6% 3% 5%  -7% 6% 10% 5% 7% 1% 0% -2%  3%  9%  10% 
F5 Shares and other equity  2% 3% 0% 0% 4% 3% -1% -2%  7% 4% 2% 3% 5% 4% 2% -3%     8%  6% 
F6 Insurance tech. reserves  2% 2% 1% 12% 3%    0% 12% 3% 3%     15%  14% 
F7 Other receivable/payable  0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 2% 1% -1%  0% 0% 7% 10% 6% 6% 1% 1% 2%  2%  5%  4% 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database.  
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Financial derivatives (F34) were the component with the highest growth rate, 
but they are still accounting for “only” 10% on the total balance sheet at the end of 
the period. Loans (F4) grew 3% faster than GDP. Shares (F5) grew 2% faster than 
GDP. Insurance technical reserves (F6) grew 2% faster than GDP. Total Liabilities of 
the Euro Area domestic economy grew 3% faster than GDP. Currency and deposits 
(F2) grew 3% faster than GDP, slightly less than the corresponding assets, but their 
more monetary components (F21 and F22), grew faster than the corresponding assets 
(4% and 8% respectively). Securities (F3) grew 5% faster than GDP. Loans (F4) 
grew 3% faster than GDP
11. Shares and equity (F5) grew 3% faster than GDP. Insur-
ance Technical Reserves (F6) grew 2% faster than GDP. The sector with the fastest 
growth of total financial assets was the Rest of the World (8% faster than GDP), fol-
lowed by non-monetary financial institutions (S12-S121-S122), growing at 5% fast-
er, financial institutions (S12), the Government (S13), non-financial corporates (S11) 
and households (S14&15). These results are discussed in more detail in the following 
paragraphs for each sector. 
 
5.2 Non-Financial Corporations (S10)  
 
Levels: Non-financial corporations (S11, NFC) have typically a negative net finan-
cial position (-97% of EA’s GDP in 2010).  
 
Table 6   Non-Financial Corporations (S10) - Financial Account – 2010 
 
  
S11 - EUR bn S11 - % of GDP
2010 Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net 
BF90 Net financial assets 8 871   8 871   -97%   -97%   
F_AS Financial assets  9 528   9 528   104%   104%   
F_LI Financial liabilities  18 399   18 399   201%   201%   
F1 Monetary gold and special drawing rights (SDRs) - - 0%   0%   
F2 Currency and deposits 1 953   28   1 924   21%   0%   21%   
F21 Currency  107   - 107   1%   0%   1%   
F22 Transferable deposits 1 081   28   1 053   12%   0%   12%   
F29 Other deposits  764   - 764   8%   0%   8%   
F3 Securities other than shares 302   892   590   3%   10%   -6%   
F33 Securities other than shares, excl. der. 282   855   572   3%   9%   -6%   
F331 Short-term – excl. derivatives 67   76   9   1%   1%   0%   
F332 Long-term - excl. derivatives 215   779   564   2%   9%   -6%   
F34 Financial derivatives 20   37   18   0%   0%   0%   
F4 Loans  13 7 2    63 3 4    49 6 2    1 5 %    6 9 %    -54%   
F41 Short-term - Loans  768   1 709   941   8%   19%   -10%   
F42 Long-term - Loans  604   4 625   4 021   7%   51%   -44%   
F5 Shares and other equity 43 3 9    94 8 7    51 4 8    4 7 %    1 0 4 %    -56%   
F6 Insurance technical reserves 170   336   165   2%   4%   -2%   
F7 Other accounts receivable / payable 1 391   1 321   70   15%   14%   1%   
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
In their consolidated balance sheet the latter is compensated by net fixed as-
sets, which however are not included in the financial account but are reported in the 
capital account
12. For corporates, net financing is essentially coming from loans 
                                                        
11 The definitions relating to F2 and their relations with the more usual monetary aggregates (M0, M1, 
M2, M3) are discussed in an Annex available upon request. 
12 In an Annex available upon request, data are provided on the relative magnitude of the non-financial 
and financial assets for some countries.  
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(50%) and from equity (50%). Non-financial corporates’ total financial assets 
represented 104% of EA’s GDP and were composed mainly of shares, but also loans 
and other receivables. It is noteworthy that NFC keep liquid assets (gold, currency 
and deposits) for some 21% of GDP. Financial liabilities of non-financial corporates 
are much higher than financial assets, representing about 200% of GDP. The main 
liability is shares (F5), representing about 104% of GDP, which correspond to the net 
fixed assets of non-financial corporates. Long-term loans (F42) represented 51%; 
short term loans (F41) 19%. 
Dynamics: As shown in Table 5, in dynamic terms, total assets of S11 have 
been growing “only” 1% faster than GDP. The fastest growth was that of loans (F4), 
which have been growing 7% faster than GDP, reaching 15% of GDP in 2010. Other 
deposits (F29) had a fast expansion too (5%). Like total assets, total liabilities of S11 
have been growing 1% faster than GDP.  
 
5.3 Financial Corporations (S12) 
 
Levels: The Financial Assets of the consolidated Financial Sector of the Euro Area 
(S12) amounted to 39,319 billions Euros in 2010, representing 429% of the area’s 
GDP, or 77% of the financial assets of the total domestic economy. As shown in Ta-
ble 7 below, the main assets held were loans (F4), which amounted to 15,304 billions 
Euros or 167% of GDP.  
Total financial liabilities of S12 were at 38,144 billions euros, or 416% of 
GDP, i.e. allowed for a net financial worth of 1,176 billions Euros (6% of GDP). The 
main liabilities were currency and deposits (F2), with 14,878 billions Euros or 162% 
of GDP. The net negative position of 10,047 billions Euros in terms of currency and 
deposits (-110% of GDP) and the net positive position of 13,483 billions of Euros 
(147% of GDP) in terms of loans (F4) and of 3,523 billions Euros (38% of GDP) in 
terms of securities other than shares (F3), reflects the role of financial institutions in 
credit and money creation and destruction. Their negative net position of 5,535 bil-
lions euros (-60% of GDP) for technical reserves, reflects the role of the insurance 
industry in collecting liquidity and investing it for the coverage of the risks taken.   
When the S12 aggregate is broken down between monetary and non-monetary 
financial institutions (respectively MFI and NMFI), the role of the consolidated 
banking sector in money and credit creation comes out more neatly. The latter in-
cludes the central bank and the rest of the monetary financial institutions (presented 
under the heading S121_S122), which should in principle consolidate internal flows 
between S121 and S122. This aggregate shows a net negative balance of -114% of 
GDP for currency and deposits, matching exactly the positive balance for loans (F4). 
This corresponds also by and large to the size of M3 (cf. Annex, available upon re-
quest). 
Reflecting an ex post balance, it is consistent with both the conventional ap-
proach linked to the quantitative theory of money of Milton Friedman and descend-
ing from the currency school, according to which deposits make loans, which is pre-
sented in most economic textbooks, and the alternative money endogeneity approach, 
descending from the banking school arguments, according to which loans make de-
posits (Basil Moore 1979, 1989; Lavoie 1984; Eisner 1995; Graziani 2003).    
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Table 7   Financial Corporations (S12) - Financial Account - Year 2010 
 
 
S12 - EUR bn S121_S122 - EUR bn S12-(S121+S122) - EUR bn 
2010  Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net 
BF90 Net financial assets  11 7 6    11 7 6    650   650   525   525  
F_AS Financial assets  39 319   39 319   19 824   19 824   19 495   19 495  
F_LI Financial liabilities  38 144   38 144   19 174   19 174   18 970   18 970  
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs 388   388   294   294   94   94  
F2 Currency and deposits  4 831   14 878   10 047   2 875   13 278   10 403   1 956   1 601   355  
F21 Currency  4   668   664   6   522   516   2   147   148  
F22 Transferable deposits  1 162   4 881   3 719   956   4 579   3 623   206   302   96  
F29 Other deposits  3 666   9 329   5 664   1 913   8 177   6 264   1 752   1 152   600  
F3 Securities other than shares 98 8 7    63 6 4    35 2 3    4 574   3 869   705   5 313   2 496   2 817  
F33 Securities o. t. shares, ex. der. 9 009   5 534   3 475   4 219   3 489   730   4 791   2 046  2 745  
F331 Short-term excl. derivatives 747   378   369   358   266   93   389   112   277  
F332 Long-term excl. derivatives 8 262   5 156   3 106   3 860   3 223   637   4 402   1 934   2 468  
F34 Financial derivatives  878   830   48   356   380   25   522   450   72  
F4 Loans  15 304   1 821   13 483   10 683   252   10 431   4 622   1 569   3 053  
F41 Short-term – Loans  3 393   783   2 610   2 505   7   2 498   888   776   112  
F42 Long-term – Loans  11 911   1 038   10 873   8 178   244   7 933   3 734   793   2 940  
F5 Shares and other equity  79 9 1    8 602   611   1 033   1 372   339   6 958   7 231   272  
F6 Insurance technical reserves 28   5 564   5 535   1   67   66   27   5 497   5 470  
F7 Other receivable / payable 889   914   25   364   337   27   525   577   52  
S12 - % of GDP S121_S122 - % of GDP S12-(S121+S122) - % GDP 
2010  Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net 
BF90 Net financial assets  13%   13%   7%   7%   6%   6%  
F_AS Financial assets  429%   429%   216%   216%   213%   213%  
F_LI Financial liabilities  416%   416%   209%   209%   207%   207%  
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs 4%   4%   3%   3%   1%   1%  
F2 Currency and deposits  53%   162%   -110%   31%   145%   -114%   21%   18%   4%  
F21 Currency  0%   7%   -7%   0%   6%   -6%   0%   2%   -2%  
F22 Transferable deposits  13%   53%   -41%   10%   50%   -40%   2%   3%   -1%  
F29 Other deposits  40%   102%   -62%   21%   89%   -68%   19%   13%   7%  
F3 Securities other than shares 108%   70%   38%   50%   42%   8%   58%   27%   31%  
F33 Securities o. t. shares, ex. der. 98%   60%   38%   46%   38%   8%   52%   22%   30%  
F331 Short-term excl. derivatives 8%   4%   4%   4%   3%   1%   4%   1%   3%  
F332 Long-term excl. derivatives 90%   56%   34%   42%   35%   7%   48%   21%   27%  
F34 Financial derivatives  10%   9%   1%   4%   4%   0%   6%   5%   1%  
F4 Loans  167%   20%   147%   117%   3%   114%   50%   17%   33%  
F41 Short-term – Loans  37%   9%   29%   27%   0%   27%   10%   8%   1%  
F42 Long-term – Loans  130%   11%   119%   89%   3%   87%   41%   9%   32%  
F5 Shares and other equity  87%   94%   -7%   11%   15%   -4%   76%   79%   -3%  
F6 Insurance technical reserves 0%   61%   -60%   0%   1%   -1%   0%   60%   -60%  
F7 Other receivable / payable 10%   10%   0%   4%   4%   0%   6%   6%   -1%  
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
In the year 2010, the consolidated banking sector represented approximately 
half of the consolidated financial sector in terms of total assets and liabilities: 219% 
of GDP. Loans represented 116%, against 167% for S12. On the liabilities side cur-
rency and deposits were at 145% of GDP, illustrating the unique role of banks as 
producers of liquid liabilities used as means of payments by the rest of the economy. 
Equity represented 15% of GDP against 94% for S12, i.e. much less than 50% of 
S12. This should in principle respect the 8% of Basel I-II criteria and it is currently 
debated whether it is sufficient or not in term of banking regulation (for a thorough 
critical view on Basel III criteria see Rainer Masera 2012 and 2013; and for a critique 
of the capital standards from a monetary circuit point of view see Vallageas 2013). 
The aggregate for Non-Monetary Financial Institutions (NMFI) was calculated in 
Table 7 above by subtraction of S121_S122 from S12. The consolidated assets of 
NMFI represent the other half of the financial account of S12 or 209% of GDP. 
Shares and equity (F5) was the largest item on the asset side, accounting for 86% of  
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GDP followed by securities (58%) and loans (50%). On the liability side, insurance 
technical reserves (F6) represented 60% of GDP, loans (F4) 33% and securities (F3): 
31%. The net positions obtained show that by and large the sector finances itself by 
technical reserves, for some 60% of GDP, i.e. absorbs liquid savings from house-
holds and enterprises, which are lent or invested in securities more or less in equal 
proportions.  
Dynamics: As shown in Figures 14 and 15 below, the total financial assets of 
S12 almost doubled in Euro terms between 2000 and 2010, from 20,000 billion Eu-
ros to close to 40,000 billion Euros. 
 
Euro Area financial institutions (S12) - financial assets by country 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 14   EA S12 FA Cumulated by Country 
  
Euro Area financial institutions (S12) - financial assets by country EUR bn 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
  
Figure 15   EA S12 Financial Assets by Country 
 
As it is visible in the figure, part of the increase, but not all, is due to the fact 
that Luxembourg only provides data starting from 2005. Germany represents some 
25% of the total of the Euro area. Its total financial assets have remained rather stable 
or slightly increasing in absolute terms, but have been decreasing in terms of share of 
the total. France’s financial assets increased fast, doubling from 3,900 billion Euros 
in 2000 to 7,700 billion Euros in 2010. The total financial assets of the Netherlands 
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exceed those of Italy: they also almost doubled from 2,600 billion Euros to 5,400 
billion Euros during the period. Luxembourg’s financial assets exceed those of Italy 
or Spain, reflecting its role as European financial center. Italy exceeds Spain, having 
grown from 2,000 billion Euros in 2000 to 3,800 billion Euros in 2010, but Spain 
catches up quickly. It went from 1,300 billion Euros in 2000 to 3,000 billion Euros in 
2010. For the rest of the Euro Area, which includes New Member States, there was a 
fast increase in total assets. Looking at the breakdown between monetary and non-
monetary institutions in Figures 16-20, their gross assets and liabilities have been 
growing fast, particularly during the period 2002-2007, when NMFI institutions total 
assets grew faster: from 1.3% of GDP to 2% of GDP (Figure 17), against an increase 
from 1.6% to 2% for MFI (Figure 16), probably under the effect of inflation in equity 
prices.  
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 16   EA MFI: Gross Financial Assets and Liabilities, % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 17 EA-NMFI: Gross Financial Assets and Liabilities, % of GDP 
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Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 18 EA MFI: Net Financial Assets and Liabilities, % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 19   EA NMFI: Net Financial Assets and Liabilities, % of GDP 
 
When net positions are considered for each type of financial product (Figures 
18 and 19), the specific activities of the two groups of financial institutions appear 
more clearly: MFI essentially have loans in their assets and currency and deposits 
and equity in their liabilities. Here the causality is assumed to go from loans to de-
posits in the banking school interpretation retained in the approach of the monetary 
circuit, whereas the in theory of emission, more focussed on equilibrium positions in 
a closed system, a more symmetrical role of loans and deposits is retained (Claude 
Gnos 2006). Both approaches bring de facto to the same policy conclusions, the equi-
librium assumptions of the theory of emission being more adapted for the study of 
the international payment system (Schmitt 1975a, b; Alvaro Cencini 2008). NMFI 
collect instead essentially liquid savings already created and invest them essentially 
in bonds, loans and liquid assets, thus working more under the traditional type of 
causality from savings to investment. Both monetary and non-monetary institutions 
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had a continuous expansion of their net financial positions in excess of GDP, of the 
order of 35% cumulative from 2000 to 2010: from 51% to 69% for MFI and from 
90% to 125% for NMFI. In terms of the breakdown by sub-sectors and products, Ta-
ble 8 below presents the average annual rates of growth of the ratios of financial as-
sets to GDP.  
 
Table 8   EA: Average Annual Growth Rate of Financial Assets and Liabilities by Financial  
Sub-Sector for the Period 2000-2010 
 
Annual growth 2000-2010 % per annum 
S12 S121_S122 S121 S122 S12-(S121+S122) S123 S124 S125 
A L A L A L A L A L A L A L A  L 
BF90 Net financial assets  0.5% 0.4% 0.0% -0.1% 0.6% 0.6% -0.3% 0.6% 
Total Financial assets/Liabilities  4% 4% 3% 3% 9% 8% 6%  6% 5% 4% 9% 9% 6% 6% 3%  3% 
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs  9% 9% 8%    10%      
F2 Currency and deposits  6% 3% 6% 4% 9% 10% 7%  5% 5% -1% 17% 0% 21% 2%    
F21 Currency  4% 0% 2% 5% 0%     0% 10%      
F22 Transferable deposits  11% 6% 13% 7% 3% 7% 10%  8% 5% 1% 11% 2% 4%    
F29 Other deposits  5% 2% 4% 3% 10% 29% 6%  5% 5% -2% 19% 0% 40% 2%    
F3 Securities other than shares  5% 5% 5% 3% 9% 7% 9%  9% 5% 12% 8% 17% 2% 7% 5%  20% 
F33 Secur. o. t. shares excl. der.  4% 4% 5% 2% 8% 0% 8%  8% 4% 11% 7% 17% 2% 7% 5%  12% 
F331 Short-term - excl. der.  7% 4% 6% 3% 4% 9%  6% 9% 7% 10% 23% 0%      
F332 Long-term - excl.der.  4% 4% 4% 2% 9% 8%  8% 4% 12% 7% 17% 0% 4% 5%  12% 
F34 Financial derivatives  18% 18% 21% 21% 17%  15% 17% 15% 18%      
F4 Loans  3% 7% 3% 4% 3% 5%  8% 5% 8% 11% 9% 15% 25% 0%  5% 
F41 Short-term - Loans  3% 9% 2% 12% 3%  0% 5% 9% 6% 6% 27% 1%  5% 
F42 Long-term - Loans  4% 6% 3% 5% -7% 6%  10% 5% 7% 13% 11% 7% 12% -1%  6% 
F5 Shares and other equity  4% 3% -1% -2% 7% 4% 2%  3% 5% 4% 8% 7% 0% -4% 2%  -7% 
F6 Insurance technical reserves  12% 3% 0% 0% 12% 3% 21%  4% 
F7 Other receivable/payable  3% 2% 1% -1% 0% 0% 7%  10% 6% 6% 8% 10% 7% 0% 2%  0% 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
From 2000 to 2010 total financial assets and liabilities of financial institutions 
grew 4% faster than GDP, with a faster expansion of non-monetary financial institu-
tions, particularly the other financial intermediaries except insurance corporations 
and pension funds (S123), which include financial intermediaries engaged in long-
term financing such as leasing, personal or commerce finance, factoring, dealers of 
derivatives and securities etc. (Annex available upon request.) These have been 
growing 9% faster than GDP, ending up with total assets equivalent to 150% of 
GDP, and of financial auxiliaries (S124), which includes insurance brokers, loans 
and securities brokers, arrangers of swaps, derivatives etc. The latter have been 
growing at 6%, ending with a level of assets of 7% of GDP. On the contrary insur-
ance corporations and pension funds (S125) have been growing “only” 3% faster 
than GDP to reach 71% of GDP in 2010. Financial assets of monetary institutions 
(S121_S122) have been growing 3% faster than GDP, but their two more monetary 
components, taken separately, grew much faster, respectively 9% for S121 and 6% 
for S122, implying logically either a fast development of positions between the two 
sectors that have disappeared in the consolidation, or some problem with the consoli-
dation
13. In terms of products, for all subsectors, the fastest growth on the assets and 
liabilities sides was that of financial derivatives (F34), which for assets and for S12 
exceeded that of GDP by 18%, reaching a level of some 10% of GDP in 
2010.Transferable deposits (F22), which have been also growing much faster than 
GDP (11%), account for a large portion of total assets (54% of GDP in 2010). Total 
                                                        
13 The S121_122 aggregate was recently withdrawn from the Eurostat website. The original data was 
downloaded from the website of Eurostat in the period April-August 2012. The article was closed in 
February 2013.  
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securities other than shares (F3) have also been growing faster than GDP (5%), 
reaching 76% of GDP in 2010. On the liability side, total liabilities grew 4% faster 
than GDP. Financial derivatives (F34): 18% faster. Loans (F4): 7% faster. 
 
5.4 General Government (S13)  
 
The net assets of General Government (GG) are negative by some 58% of GDP in 
2010. This is the balance of positive holdings of shares equal to 15% of GDP and net 
liabilities of -66% for securities and -11% for loans (hence debt is of the order of 
77%).  
 
Table 9 General Government (S13) - Financial Account - Year 2010 
 
 
S13 - EUR bn S13 - % of GDP
2010 Assets Liabilities  Net Assets Liabilities Net
  
BF90 Net financial assets 5 274   5 274   -58%   -58%  
F_AS Financial assets 3 153   3 153   34%   34%  
F_LI Financial liabilities 8 426   8 426   92%   92%  
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs -    - 0%   0%  
F2 Currency and deposits 572   293   279   6%   3%   3%  
F21 Currency 1   23   23   0%   0%   0%  
F22 Transferable deposits 237   149   87   3%   2%   1%  
F29 Other deposits 335   121   214   4%   1%   2%  
F3 Securities other than shares 333   6 328   5 995   4%   69%   -66%  
F33 Securities o. t. shares ex. der. 338   6 322   5 984   4%   69%   -65%  
F331 Short-term - excl. der. 14   664   649   0%   7%   -7%  
F332 Long-term - excl. der. 324   5 659   5 335   4%   62%   -58%  
F34 Financial derivatives 5   5   10   0%   0%   0%  
F4 Loans  380   1 422   1 042   4%   16%   -11%  
F41 Short-term – Loans 28   298   270   0%   3%   -3%  
F42 Long-term – Loans 352   1 124   772   4%   12%   -9%  
F5 Shares and other equity 1 312   4   1 308   14%   0%   14%  
F6 Insurance technical reserves 4   1   3   0%   0%   0%  
F7 Other receivable/payable 552   378   173   6%   4%   2%  
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Dynamics: Total assets and liabilities of the General Government have been 
growing 2% faster than GDP, therefore faster than households and non-financial cor-
porates, but less than financial corporations and the rest of the world. On the asset 
side the fastest growth was that of securities other than shares (F3) that have been 
growing 13% faster than GDP, reaching 4% in 2010. On the liability side the growth 
of securities (F3) was 2% faster than GDP. The fact that total financial liabilities of 
the General Government have been growing less than those of the private sector, in-
dicates that public debt must have grown less than private debt. Indeed Figures 20 
and 21 below confirm that, implying that excessive public debt cannot be retained as 
a possible cause of the crisis. This can be seen by looking at the net positions for se-
curities other than shares excluding derivatives (F33) and for loans (F4), which have 
been plotted in these figures for each sector and subsector.  
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Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 20   EA Net Holdings of Loans and Securities Excluding Derivatives (F33+F4) - % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 21   EA Net Holdings of Loans and Securities Excl. Derivatives (F33+F4) in % of Total  
 Liabilities 
 
As can be seen in Figure 21, the share of the combined net debt liabilities of 
the Government in the total net liabilities of the economy has been decreasing from 
45% in 2000 to 35% in 2007, to then increase again to 40% in 2010. This confirms 
other evidence presented in Massimo Cingolani (2012) in support of Parguez’s inter-
pretation according to which the crisis was triggered by an excessive development of 
private debt compared to public debt, rather than by an excessive development of 
“public profligacy”. The above conclusions are in line with the interpretation of the 
modern monetary economy made by the monetary circuit. If also currency and depo-
sits (F2) are considered, these results do not change.  
Indeed, a further confirmation of a relative lack of “good public liabilities” in 
the economy can be found in the evolution of the sum of central bank monetary lia-
bilities and Government debt compared to an extended notion of total debt compris-
ing F2, F3 and F4 for the whole economy. The relevant series are reported in Table 
10 below. 
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Table 10   Liabilities of GG in Total Debt Assets of the Euro Area 
 
EUR bn 2000 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009  2010 
F2 Liabilities of S121 and S13  (1) 559 611 670 759 877 1 096 1 467 1 382 1 363
F3 Liabilities of S13  (2) 37 6 8 43 5 3 46 5 4 48 8 0 48 3 7 48 5 4 54 2 0 6  0 3 9 6  3 2 8
GG liabilities  (3=1+2) 43 2 7 49 6 4 53 2 4 56 3 9 57 1 4 59 5 0 68 8 7 7  4 2 0 7  6 9 0
F2 Monetary assets of S1  (4) 5 249 6 239 6 714 7 499 8 853 9 907 10 091 9 971 10 178
F3 Securities assets of S1  (5) 42 9 6 54 1 6 59 5 2 66 8 3 79 6 7 84 8 2 89 9 7 9  3 0 3 9  5 8 6
F4 Loans assets of S1  (6) 6 551 7 509 7 849 8 497 9 845 10 897 11 696 11 687 12 321
Total debt assets (F2,F3,F4)  (7=4+5+6) 16 095 19 164 20 515 22 679 26 665 29 286 30 784 30 961 32 085
Government liabilities in % of total (8=3/7) 27% 26% 26% 25% 21% 20% 22% 24% 24%
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
5.5 Households and Non-Profit Institutions (S14 & S15) 
 
Levels: As shown in Table 11 below, Households and Non-Profit Institutions Serv-
ing Households (NPIH: S14+S15) have a positive net financial position of 132% of 
GDP, which is the balance of a positive position of 200% for assets and a 68% nega-
tive position for liabilities. The main financial assets in gross and net terms are cur-
rency and deposits (71%), insurance reserves (61%), equity (48%) and securities 
(15%). The main component of household’s liabilities is given by long-term loans, 
which represent 60% of GDP and should correspond by and large with residential 
assets, not included in the financial account. In this case total household’s net worth 
should be of the order of 200% of GDP. 
 
Table 11   Households and NPI (S14&S15) - Financial Account 2010 
 
 
S14_S15 - EUR bn S14_S15 - % of GDP
2010 Assets Liabilities  Net Assets Liabilities Net 
 
BF90 Net financial assets 12 044    12 044   132%   132%   
F_AS Financial assets 18 285   18 285   200%   200%   
F_LI Financial liabilities 62 4 1     6 241   68%   68%   
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs -    - 0%   0%   
F2 Currency and deposits 64 8 9    -  6 489   71%   0%   71%   
F21 Currency  577   -  577   6%   0%   6%   
F22 Transferable deposits 2 204   -  2 204   24%   0%   24%   
F29 Other deposits 3 708   -  3 708   41%   0%   41%   
F3 Securities other than shares 13 3 6    0     1 336   15%   0%   15%   
F33 Securities o. t. shares, ex. der. 1 336   0    1 336   15%   0%   15%   
F331 Short-term - excl. der. 32   0    32   0%   0%   0%   
F332 Long-term - excl. der 1 304   -  1 304   14%   0%   14%   
F34 Financial derivatives 0   0    0   0%   0%   0%   
F4 Loans  76   5 797    5 721   1%   63%   -63%   
F41 Short-term - Loans 18   298    280   0%   3%   -3%   
F42 Long-term - Loans 58   5 499    5 441   1%   60%   -59%   
F5 Shares and other equity 43 8 9    1     4 388   48%   0%   48%   
F6 Insurance technical reserves 5 555   0    5 555   61%   0%   61%   
F7 Other receivable / payable 439   442    3   5%   5%   0%   
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Dynamics: From 2000 to 2010, total financial assets of households grew just 
in line with GDP, as the rate of growth of the ratio of financial assets to GDP was 
zero%. On the assets side the highest growth was that of currency and transferable 
deposits, F22, which has been growing 5% faster than GDP. It is noteworthy that, 
contrary to assets, total liabilities of households grew 3% faster than GDP, driven by 
long-term loans (see Table 5), implying that their net financial net worth has de-
creased. The fast development of transferable deposits on the asset side in this con-
text of stable financial assets and growing debt shows that “liquidity preference” has  
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increased. Riccardo Bellofiore and Halevi (2011) have described the above develop-
ments in terms of “traumatized workers, indebted consumers and manic-depressive 
savers”. 
 
5.6 Rest of the World (S2)  
 
Levels: As shown in Table 12 below, the Rest of the World (RoW) shows a net posi-
tive financial assets balance equal to 14% of GDP. It holds EU currency for 17% of 
GDP, EU securities for 14% and shares for 7%, whereas it is indebted, having taken 
loans (F4) for the equivalent of 23% of GDP of the Euro Area in net terms. Gross 
financial assets of the RoW represented 348% of GDP in 2010. 
 
Table 12   Rest of the World (S2) - Financial Account - Year 2010 
 
 
S2 - EUR bn S2 - % of GDP
2010 Assets Liabilities Net Assets Liabilities Net
BF90 Net financial assets 12 7 3    12 7 3    14%   14%   
F_AS Financial assets 31 843   31 843   348%   348%   
F_LI Financial liabilities 30 570   30 570   334%   334%   
F1 Monetary gold and SDRs 26   26   0%   0%   
F2 Currency and deposits 64 7 7    49 0 6    15 7 1    71%   54%   17%   
F21 Currency  199   105   95   2%   1%   1%   
F22 Transferable deposits 1 577   1 210   367   17%   13%   4%   
F29 Other deposits  4 793   3 592   1 201   52%   39%   13%   
F3 Securities other than shares 98 7 0    8 598   12 7 2    108%   94%   14%   
F33 Securities o. t. shares, ex. der. 8 989   7 695   1 294   98%   84%   14%   
F331 Short-term - excl. der. 838   826   12   9%   9%   0%   
F332 Long-term - excl. der. 8 152   6 869   1 282   89%   75%   14%   
F34 Financial derivatives 881   902   21   10%   10%   0%   
F4 Loans  37 0 5    5 830   21 2 4    40%   64%   -23%   
F41 Short-term – Loans 1 564   2 654   1 091   17%   29%   -12%   
F42 Long-term – Loans 2 142   3 175   1 034   23%   35%   -11%   
F5 Shares and other equity 10 784   10 122   662   118%   111%   7%   
F6 Insurance technical reserves 320   99   221   4%   1%   2%   
F7 Other receivable / payable 713   922   209   8%   10%   -2%   
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
The main item were shares (F5): 118%, Securities (F3): 108%. Currency and 
deposits (F2): 71%. These figures imply a potentially much stronger effect of a de-
valuation though exchange rate gains or losses on financial assets and liabilities held 
than through the real flows of exports and imports, as the calculated degree of open-
ness is much higher (348%/560% = 62%, against about 15% openness ratio for flows 
at the level of the Euro Area). Total Financial Liabilities of the RoW represented 
334% of GDP, of which the main components were equities (F5): 111%; securities 
(F3): 95%; currency and deposits (F2): 33%. 
Dynamics: The total financial assets of the RoW have been growing 8% faster 
than GDP between 2000 and 2010 (see Table 5).  
 
5.7 Discussion  
 
The analysis of the previous paragraphs has shown that in the period 2000-2011 for 
the Euro Area the developments observed point to the presence of financial asset 
price inflation (Toporowski 2000, 2010), which can be retained as a factor explaining 
an increase of financial assets that is on average 3% faster than that of GDP in no- 
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minal terms. This is confirmed by the composition of this growth in terms of finan-
cial products and sectors. The fastest growing products have been securities, curren-
cy and deposits and equity. The fastest growing sectors have been the financial sec-
tors. More specifically: 
i.   the financial assets and liabilities of the domestic economy have expanded 
3-4% faster than GDP, i.e. they have grown at 6.5% per year on average in absolute 
terms. Apart from monetary gold, in the domestic economy the fastest growth was 
that of securities (F3), followed by currency and deposits, especially for the financial 
sector. Equity also increased fast; 
ii.  private liabilities expanded much faster than public ones, with a tendency 
towards financial fragility; 
iii.   financial institutions (S12) have been growing 4% faster than GDP. Mone-
tary financial institutions have been growing at 3% faster than GDP; non-monetary 
ones at 5%; 
iv. the financial liabilities of the Government increased by 2%; 
v. those of non-financial corporates (S10) have increased 1% faster than 
GDP; 
vi. the financial assets of households stagnated while, their financial liabilities 
increased by 3%. In net terms the households lost, all others gained; 
vii.  the financial assets and liabilities of the RoW grew by 8%. Globally the 
domestic economy lost to the Rest of the World, but the balance is rather small. 
Financial asset price inflation was decoupled from net real fixed asset accumu-
lation, particularly after the crisis. As shown in the Figures 22-30 below in all coun-
tries examined, the net investment rate, labeled INET, which gives the change in 
fixed assets over GDP
 14 has remained either stable with fluctuations or significantly 
declined after the crisis, while there was a fast increase in the ratio of financial assets 
and liabilities over GDP (F_AS and F_LI). This is particularly clear for Germany 
where the net investment rate declined almost continuously from 7.5% of GDP in 
2000 to some 2% in 2010, whereas financial assets over GDP have been increasing 
from 475% to some 735%. Austria and the Netherlands showed developments simi-
lar to Germany. In the Netherlands the ratio of financial assets to GDP increased 
from around 1,100% in 2000 to some 1,500% in 2010, whereas the net investment 
rate was falling from 8% to 2-3%. In Austria the financial assets over GDP increased 
from 400% in 1995 to 650% in 2010, whereas the net investment rate declined from 
9% to some 4.5%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
14 Fixed capital formation net of capital consumption over GDP. It measures in principle the increase in 
the stock of fixed capital assets of the economy (normalized by GDP). In a single good economy, divided 
by the capital output ratio, it gives the GDP growth rate, according to the Harrod-Domar relation.  
278  Massimo Cingolani 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 3, Special Issue, pp. 249-290 
Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP  
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 22   EU27: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation in %  
 of  GDP 
 
Euro Area (17): Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 23   EA17: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
 
France is the possible exception where the very fast increase in financial as-
sets/GDP ratios was initially accompanied by a rise in the investment rate, which fell 
however with the crisis. For Italy Spain and Belgium there was some correlation be-
tween the expansion of the financial assets/GDP ratios and the net investment rate 
during the increasing phase of the cycle in the mid 2000-2010, possibly driven by 
residential price inflation particularly in Spain where the net investment ratio started 
from a very high level in 2000, however the net investment rate followed the finan-
cial assets / GDP ratios up to 2007 and then declined dramatically with the crisis. 
Unsurprisingly, countries such as Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, which 
usually generate external current account surpluses, have been improving continu-
ously their financial net worth, while others such as Italy, Spain and to a lesser extent 
France, that tend to have current external account deficits, have seen their financial 
liabilities growing faster than their financial assets (see Antoine Brunet 2009; Jean-
Paul Guichard 2009).  
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Germany: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 24   DE: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
 
France: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 25   FR: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
in % of GDP 
 
Italy: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 26   IT: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
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Spain: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 27   ES: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
 
Belgium: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 28   BE: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
 
Netherlands: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 29   NL: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
  
281  Finance Capitalism: A Look at the European Financial Accounts 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2013, 3, Special Issue, pp. 249-290
Austria: Financial assets (F_AS), liabilities (F_LI), net worth (BF90) and net investment rate (INET) as a % of GDP 
 
 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat Financial and Sector Accounts online databases. 
 
Figure 30   AT: Financial Assets and Liabilities versus Net Fixed Gross Capital Formation  
  in % of GDP 
 
Overall, for EU27 and the Euro Area, the increase in financial liabilities 
slightly exceeded that of financial assets over the period, and went together with a 
decline in the rate of accumulation of fixed assets assets by 3-4% points of GDP, 
indicating a strong drop of the “marginal efficiency of investment” as perceived by 
the private sector, implying divergent expectations in the financial sphere and in the 
real economy, a symptom but also a possible cause of the crisis. 
 
6. A Monetary Circuit Interpretation 
 
In the last decade credit and money growth exceeded that of the real economy in 
Europe, a phenomenon that has occurred also in other countries. Figure 31, which is 
an elaboration on Figure 21, illustrates the developments for the Euro Area for the 
net position of the sum of securities excluding derivatives (F33) and loans (F4). It 
shows that the net position of the monetary financial institutions, which is due essen-
tially to loans (F4), increased from some 85% of GDP to some 125% of GDP be-
tween 2000 and 2010 (thick black line on the left axis). At the same time households 
increased their net debts measured by the net of loans taken (F4) less investment in 
securities (F3), which increased from some 30% of GDP to some 45% (right vertical 
axis, triangles)
15, while non-financial corporates increased their net debt position in 
terms of securities and loans (F33+F4) from some 45% to close to 65% in 2009 (line 
with crosses, right hand axis). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 With respect to Figure 21, the sign was changed for net liabilities, which have therefore positive sign, 
like assets. There is no ambiguity however, because in net terms each sector is either positive or negative 
for a particular financial product.  
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Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
  
Figure 31   Net Financial Flows between Sectors 
 
Meanwhile the net debt position of the Government sector for the same prod-
ucts remained stable around 65% of GDP or declined until 2007, to then increase 
with the crisis (line with circles, right hand axis). In order to capture also the pheno-
menon of the collection of liquid savings by non-monetary financial institutions dis-
cussed with reference to Figure 19 above, Figure 31 also reports the net “absorbing 
liquid position” of this sector in terms of technical reserves. The latter has increased 
from some 45% of GDP in 1990 to some 60% in 2010, showing that this sector has 
been absorbing increasing quantities of “fresh” savings (line with squares, right hand 
axis). 
These facts can be interpreted in a monetary post Keynesian logic
16. With the 
help of a model of the pure labour economy, Pasinetti (1993, pp. 82-83) has elegantly 
demonstrated how and why financial securities can be accumulated even in the ab-
sence of real accumulation. However in this case consumption cannot increase be-
yond the full employment level and, if distributed incomes do, a relative price correc-
tion is needed. Schmitt (1984) had also drawn attention to the problems of account-
ing for depreciation and the related excesses of money creation over real investment. 
Parguez (1996a) provided a neat monetary circuit explanation of how the targeting 
by rentiers of an excessive rate of financial return imposes a regime of low accumu-
lation and high unemployment on the economy. These views point towards the fol-
lowing interpretation: in a world where “financial stocks can be created without 
physical limits” (Pasinetti 2012, p. 1448) and loans make deposits, financial institu-
tions have been feeding their own “endogenous” money demand by keeping asset 
price inflation high, which generated financial rents for themselves in the form of 
capital gains. To the extent that this private money creation is not “validated” by a 
parallel increase in Government liabilities, the conditions for a liquidity crisis, which 
are also pre-conditions for a solvency crisis, are perfectly met (Cingolani 2012). This 
                                                        
16 For an overview, see Stephan Rousseas (1998). This view covers endogenous money (Moore 1989), 
the circuit approach (Rochon and Rossi 2011) as well as the Mynskian and cartalist analyses (Eric Ty-
moigne 2009; Elisabetta De Antoni 2010; Bellofiore and Halevi 2011, for Minskyan approaches; Randall 
L. Wray 2004; Pavlina R. Tchernerva 2006; Stefanie Kelton 2011, for the Cartalist approach). Philip 
Arestis and Sawyer (2006) present several surveys, showing that despite their differences, these ap-
proaches bring to rather converging policy conclusions. 
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interpretation can be illustrated by the scheme of a “double” monetary circuit, de-
picted in Figure 32, where, in the first circuit, dealing mainly with flows, true wealth 
and revenue creation takes place in the usual banking school/monetary circuit causal 
sequence: Initial Finance  Wages  Production  Consumption  Sales  Final 
Finance (Graziani 1984b). 
While, in parallel, in the second circuit the recycling of accumulated savings 
(stocks) works under the causal sequence: Initial Finance  Asset Price Inflation  
Rent creation  Financial fragility (Hyman P. Minsky 1978). 
In both circuits money is endogenously created by secondary banks on the ba-
sis of borrowers’ profit expectations (real and financial), but only that part which is 
validated by the Governments under the fiscal responsibility criteria is backed by 
“liquid” Government liabilities and thus finally validates the corresponding private 
sector bets (profits or rent endorsed by the State), the rest represents mostly financial 
rents endorsed only by secondary banks. 
 
 
Source: Calculations on data from Eurostat’s Financial Accounts, online database. 
 
Figure 32   The Double Circuit of New and Recycled Savings
17 
 
Now, due to asset price inflation, financial investment provides returns higher 
than any other activity in the real sector and therefore always finds access to final 
means of payments. The imbalance lies therefore in the excess of “bad” liquidity cre-
ation for purposes other than true revenue creation, in other words in the proportions 
between the size of the first and the second circuit. This in no way contradicts the 
view that money is endogenous and that the deposit multiplier is in fact a divisor 
(Jacques Le Bourva 1992). It raises on the contrary the question of the rationale for 
the budgetary limits on public expenditure, since they are rationing precisely those 
expenditures of the first circuit that create more economic value, leaving room for the 
development of expenditures in the second circuit, which are less productive. Correc-
tion of this imbalance requires correcting relative prices between flows and stocks, or 
                                                        
17 The way the ideas have been visualized in the figure above is heavily inspired from a drawing made by 
Prof. Claude Berthomieu in a discussion in Luxembourg on 30.05.2007. The scheme also draws upon 
Parguez (1975, 1996b), Graziani (1984a, b), Davidson (1986), Michael Hudson (2012), Anastasia Ri 
(2012), and Mario Seccareccia (2012).  
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increasing wages relative to profits and rents, which requires also increasing public 
deficits for financing investment and true revenues rather than financial rents, as im-
plicit in the related argument of Minsky (1978).  
 
7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
In the Euro Area Financial assets represents six times GDP and public debt. They are 
accumulated mainly in the balance sheets of banks and non-monetary financial insti-
tutions (including the rest of the world). In the decade 2000-2010 their evolution 
shows that there has been a transfer of wealth from the productive sectors to the fi-
nancial sector and rest of the World. The Government sector has been growing faster 
than the real wealth producing sectors, but less than the financial sector and the rest 
of the world. There was a clear decoupling of real fixed asset accumulation from the 
accumulation of financial assets. Particularly after the crisis, private producers antic-
ipate low effective demand and therefore perceive a drop in the marginal efficiency 
of investment, while the finance sector assumes that it can continue to increase its 
monopolistic position on the economy at the expense of the other sectors. Being li-
mited institutionally, public sector deficits can only passively validate the financial 
rents “authorized” by financial sector’s lending, but they cannot play a positive role 
of anchor for long-term expectations of those operators creating value and cannot 
create enough true incomes such as wages and “true profits”. The lack of a positive 
anchor for the expectations of the private sector is apparent in the importance of the 
share of currency and deposits (F2) in the assets the private sector, which reaches 
some 200% of GDP, indicating strong “liquidity preference”, increasing with the 
crisis. This confirms a “fear for the future” already apparent in the drop of the net 
investment rate.  
The above developments can be illustrated in terms of a double circuit: a “tra-
ditional” circuit of financing investment by new savings, where most “true” revenues 
are generated, and a circuit of savings’ recycling, where most rents are generated. 
Money is endogenous and originates in credit in both cases. In the circuit for re-
cycled savings, the financial sector lends to itself and borrows from abroad to feed 
asset price inflation and to extract increasing rents from the rest of the private sector, 
which remains defiant towards the future. Since there is no real accumulation, nor 
increased production, no real revenue (true wealth creation) is associated with the 
expansion of this second circuit, while the expectations of the real private sector con-
tinue to deteriorate and sooner or later the inflation in financial assets is stopped by 
the absence of new inflows of capital from the first circuit (Toporowski 2000). In this 
context, the effect of budgetary limits on public expenditures is that of rationing li-
quidity in the first circuit, not in the second, which can create liquidity at will 
through asset price inflation, and thus tends to worsen the economic situation. These 
conjectures could be tested econometrically, but given the well known limits of eco-
nometrics and the urgency to restore growth in Europe, it is preferable to spell-out 
the policy implications of the above analysis already at this stage. The Kalecki’s 
identity has the advantage of making clear that the only way to “exit from the crisis 
from above” is to restore the expectations of the private sector producing real wealth, 
for which a progressive policy mix must be implemented, based on wage increases,  
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differentiated as a function of the national intra-EU current account positions, wealth 
creating active ex ante public deficits, low interest rates set in such a way as to re-
main below the rate of growth of wages, well devised regional and industrial policies 
etc. Several proposals in this direction were made recently including Alessandro 
Roncaglia (2010), Parguez (2010-2011), Sawyer (2011), Cingolani (2011-12), Secca-
reccia (2011-2012), Hein (2012), Vallageas (2012), and others.   
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